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Abstract 
The armed forces of the U.S. military owe much of its competitive edge to the sophisticated 
design skills required to fashion complex integrated defense systems from advanced 
technologies. This study identifies the critical attributes of successful design team skills and 
the extent they are maintained through prototyping efforts. Defense system design and article 
prototyping have been proposed as a strategy to maintain the industrial base design skills 
while foregoing the expense and production engineering of full-scale system development 
and deployment. Studies of the design process and historical analyses of defense design are 
examined to identify the attributes of successful design teams and their skills. The 
engineering goals of prototyping and full-scale development efforts are discussed. A contrast 
is made with the skill development from full-scale system design, production, and 
deployment. The scope of the prototyping efforts is compared to the scope of full-scale 
system development. Design skills for prototyping and full-scale efforts are then compared, 
and an assessment is developed on the efficacy of prototyping to maintain necessary design 
skills. Implications for defense acquisition and engineering are discussed. 
Introduction 
The political and military environment after World War II laid down the architecture of 
a U.S. defense establishment that would endure for over 60 years and provide a relatively 
stable, if challenging, framework for developing and acquiring weapon systems. Despite its 
challenges, the current acquisition framework has consistently produced systems of clear 
technical superiority over almost all of its international competitors. 
The performance gap between U.S. systems and the rest of the world is closing 
faster than at any point since the end of World War II. Near-peer U.S. competitors have 
apparently managed to replicate some of the most advanced U.S. capabilities (Majumdar, 
2014). Senior leadership in the Department of Defense (DoD) is calling for a Long Range 
Research and Development Plan that will open new avenues of competitive advantage for 
U.S. armed forces. Similar efforts drove changes in strategic forces to nuclear weapons in 
the 1950s and advanced capabilities such as precision guided munitions and stealth in the 
1970s (Hagel, 2014). Coupled with the steady implementation of the Better Buying Power 
initiatives (OUSD[AT&L], 2014), the expected end state is more efficient acquisition 
processes introducing a new wave of technology into weapons acquisition programs. 
A prominent element of this strategy is the reliance on prototyping to maintain the 
development competency of industrial design teams. Such a strategy hinges on the 
assumption that design skills can be preserved through prototype development while 
avoiding the much larger cost of engineering development and production. The logic is 
appealing; however, the utility of prototyping has had a demonstrably mixed record in 
defense acquisition. Some programs, such as the Manhattan Project, were critically 
dependent on the engineering lessons of their prototype reactors (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2010). In contrast, an analysis of the F-117 program indicates that, despite its 
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remarkable HAVE BLUE prototyping effort, the development timeline was about the same 
as its contemporaneous F-16 sister project (Smith, Shulman, & Leonard, 1996).  
Understanding the complexities of this strategy requires an examination of three 
elements: (1) design as a cognitive activity in itself and traditional use of prototyping, (2) the 
record of defense prototyping, and (3) the viability of design teams. This analysis examines 
the relationship of these areas to overall systems development and prototyping and provides 
informed recommendations for a prototyping strategy. 
Design Skills and Prototyping 
The popular notion of the design process is one that begins at a high level of 
abstraction and ends in the technical details and processes of making a designed article. 
The design process is usually described as a series of sequential steps: (1) problem 
clarification, (2) conceptualizing (3) embodiments in layouts, and (4) elaboration and 
detailing (Eder, 1998). Academics and practitioners both use the mapping from the general 
to the specific alike, in part because it is readily understandable. One such depiction is given 
in Figure 1. 
 
 Development Model for Defense Acquisition Programs  
(OUSD[AT&L], 2015) 
Defense acquisition practitioners will recognize the acquisition model from the DoD 
5000.02 “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.” Milestones A, B, and C correspond 
roughly with Eder’s conceptualizing, embodiments/layout, and detail/elaboration steps, 
respectively. Prototyping activities are not explicitly called out in Figure 1—they are left to 
the discretion of the program manager. 
Program managers with any experience know that the design process is rarely a 
steady progression through milestones or decision gates. Often the design process is full of 
blind alleys as designers work through technical challenges or adapt to changes in funding 
or schedule profiles. Less well understood is the nature of the design process itself. While it 
is modeled as a sequential exercise in problem analysis and solution synthesis, real 
designers work in a far more non-linear fashion that is dictated by experience, cognitive 
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framework, and specialized knowledge. These attributes are often key in determining the 
need, form, and function of a design prototype. 
Designers at Work 
Design is taught as a progression from the abstract to the concrete where a design 
challenge is bounded, requirements identified, the design problem decomposed, and its 
component parts analyzed. Once the design challenge is completely understood, solutions 
are generated, evaluated against requirements, and an overarching solution concept 
chosen. The selected concept is built out into greater and more concrete detail during 
functional and physical allocation of requirements and then implemented with physical 
assemblies. 
NASA portrays this process as a cycle, with the finished product tested, evaluated, 
and lessons-learned applied to design modifications as appropriate. Figure 2 is an idealized 
diagram of the design process. 
 
 Idealized NASA Design Process  
(NASA, 2008) 
Prototyping is an integral part of the design process. Figure 2 is not specific about the type 
of prototype; however, the context implies a full-system prototype. 
Studies of actual designers in action indicate a less systematic approach to design, 
particularly with ‘ill-defined’ problems (Cross, 2004; Guindon, 1990). Rather than the steady 
progression from abstract concept to physical implementation of Figure 2, designers will 
often opportunistically abandon the classic “breadth-first-then-depth” approach if a partial 
solution appears to fill a known niche in the solution space. Partial design solutions are built 
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out as far as needed, after which experienced designers often return to the higher-level 
problem decomposition—or move forward with a physical prototyping effort at the full- or 
sub-system level (Guindon, 1990). This “hop-scotching” among the various design steps can 
occur throughout the design process.  
The seemingly haphazard execution of the design process at first appears inefficient, 
but in ill-defined or novel design challenges, it can be more efficient than a conventional 
breadth-to-depth approach. In novel design challenges, where there is no clear abstract-to-
detail path, designers bring their own professional references and biases when mapping out 
the solution space. Experienced designers use partial solutions and relevant analogies not 
only as building blocks toward a comprehensive solution, but also as a way to bound the 
design problem and its analysis/decomposition (Kalogerakas, Luthje, & Herstatt, 2010; 
Spitas, 2011). The partial solutions become anchor points in the solution space for the final, 
comprehensive concept. 
Practicing designers see design solutions coalesce around established, workable 
partial solutions rather than uniformly evolving from methodical solution generation. The role 
of the prototype is more complex than its depiction in Figure 2. The need for a prototype 
becomes less of a demonstration of a complete concept and more of a validation of 
contemplated, smaller scale partial solutions. As with known, validated partial solutions, this 
type of prototyping informs the design decomposition/analysis and maps the possible 
solution space. 
The practice of the individual designer becomes more complex as multiple design 
specialties are combined to produce the large systems commonly associated with defense 
programs. Teams of designers produce more than physical systems. They also produce a 
wealth of tacit knowledge, experience, and approaches that are not only signature hallmarks 
of a design organization, but often unique to the team itself. How these teams become, and 
remain, viable influences the specific role of prototyping in the design process. 
Design Teams 
Defense systems are the product of industrial design teams. Since the end of World 
War II, the industrial design teams have been the bases on which are built the weapons 
systems of the U.S. Armed Forces. The defense industrial base of the immediate post-war 
period supported dozens of large and small companies producing basic technology to 
sophisticated large systems integration (Watts, 2008; Watts & Harrison, 2011). Through 
almost 70 years of rising and falling defense budgets since the end of World War II, the 
industrial base has gradually narrowed to a small number of large system integrators, 10–20 
secondary vendors, and perhaps an equal number of tertiary companies whose primary 
business is defense articles, leading DoD senior leadership to launch a new round of 
technology offset to maintain U.S. technical supremacy (Hagel, 2014). 
DoD leadership places a high priority on preserving design team skills without 
knowing exactly the critical attributes of their success. This leads to well-intentioned, but 
poorly informed, efforts to preserve production lines and design teams that maintain the 
status quo without effectively building a path to future technical developments that lead to 
the next generation of defense systems. 
The quality and effectiveness of a design team are functions of a number of 
attributes. Studies indicate successful teams are: (1) experienced (Atman et al., 2007; 
Cross, 2001), (2) well-grounded in the system architecture under consideration (Brusoni & 
Prencipe, 2011; Henderson & Clark, 1990), (3) adept at using firm-specific knowledge to 
achieve competitive advantage (Lorell, Saunders, & Levaux, 1995), (4) active in designing 
systems and their components, (5) current on state-of-the-practice technology and 
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approaches, (6) intimately familiar with the design context and environment (Brusoni & 
Prencipe, 2001; Henderson & Clark, 1990), (7) composed of a “critical mass” of the design 
disciplines necessary to generate feasible design alternatives (Drezner et al., 1992), and (8) 
able to evaluate alternatives and find the most effective design with the lowest development 
risk (Atman et al., 2007; Cross, 2001). 
The strategies of successful design teams mirror those of individual designers. 
Familiar design challenges invite known and proven solutions with implementations suitable 
for the design context. Complex design problems are approached with breadth-first 
decomposition with designers opportunistically deploying partial design solutions to aid 
further problem decomposition and build a comprehensive design solution. The advantage 
of a well-balanced and experienced design team is that it can draw from firm-specific 
knowledge to complement its general engineering and system knowledge to develop 
competitive solutions (Drezner et al., 1992; Lorell et al., 1995). General engineering 
knowledge of a design team informs its ability to produce a quality technical product, while 
its system knowledge narrows the team’s specialty to, for example, bombers versus tactical 
aircraft. The firm-specific knowledge represents the way a design team envisions its solution 
and is based on its prior experience and accumulated, proprietary architectural knowledge. 
This is seen in the way certain design elements frequently recur in a company’s product 
developments. 
Firm-specific knowledge also informs a design team’s strategy with respect to 
prototyping. Experience with developing specific types of systems bounds the design space 
through certain requirements, constraints imposed by the customer, and physics. The firm-
specific knowledge imposes cognitive constraints and imperatives on the design teams on 
how the design space should be met in achieving a physical implementation of the design. 
The design team then deploys its development strategy, resulting in a variety of 
instantiations of prototype engineering. The next section examines the record of prototyping 
and its effectiveness in producing successful design outcomes. 
Defense Prototyping 
There are many different ways to define prototypes and prototype engineering. The 
following is a definition that can be used by the technologist and production engineer and 
strikes an appropriate balance: 
A prototype is a product (hardware and/or software) that allows hands-on 
testing in a realistic environment. In scope and scale, it represents a concept, 
subsystem, or production article with potential utility. It is built to improve the 
quality of decisions, not merely to demonstrate satisfaction of contract 
specifications. (Drezner, 1992, p. 9) 
The lead production engineer for a tactical aircraft will have a different vision of a 
prototype than the lead technologist of a technical demonstrator project. Both professionals 
can effectively use prototyping. The former may use the prototyping effort to validate a 
design prior to production, while the latter may use a prototype to inform a pending design 
decision. Both uses are appropriate in the right context. Can the production engineer use an 
EMD prototype to inform design decisions? It is certainly possible—this is the acquisition 
strategy of the F-35 with its parallel design and production efforts. Can the technologist 
make production decisions from a technology demonstrator? This approach was used in the 
F-117 development. When the critical low-observable characteristics were understood and 
marginally producible, the aircraft was pushed into production (Smith et al., 1996). Both 
programs used their respective prototypes to inform subsequent decisions. 
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Prototyping has had a mixed history in defense acquisition programs, in part 
because the terms “prototype” and “prototyping” have never been defined in a consensus 
manner (Borowski, 2012). Researchers and practitioners alike have used a variety of 
definitions with varying scope. Most acquisition professionals have an intuitive feel for the 
attributes of a prototype and prototyping efforts, but they are usually informed by the context 
in which a prototype is executed. Not surprisingly, the value of prototyping is very much 
dependent on when and how a prototyping effort is initiated and structured, respectively. 
Prototyping Value Added 
The conventional wisdom regarding prototyping is that it is always beneficial and has 
positive influence on program outcomes. The extant studies on the value of defense 
prototyping indicate a variety of program outcomes for programs that have used prototypes. 
Perhaps the most surprising observation is that program outcomes have only a weak 
relationship with prototyping efforts (Arena et al., 2006; Borowski, 2012; Drezner, 1992; 
Drezner & Huang, 2009). Cost and schedule growth of acquisition programs are as evident 
in programs with prototypes and prototype engineering as those without. 
The weak relationship is counter-intuitive. The acquisition practitioner would maintain 
that prototyping is almost always a worthwhile risk reduction technique. Examining individual 
programs reveals that the scope and timing of prototyping efforts within a program greatly 
affect the value added by the prototyping effort (Drezner & Huang, 2009; Tyson et al., 1991). 
The type of prototype, and its timing within a program, affects its value added to the program 
outcome. 
For the balance of this paper, prototype articles and engineering are classed as 
technology demonstrators (Pt), developmental prototypes (Pd), prototypes of subsystems 
(Ps), or the prototype of a whole system (Pemd). The designations Pt and Pd loosely equate to 
X- and Y-plane levels of design maturity. Subsystem prototypes, Ps are efforts restricted to a 
subset of a system architecture, for example aircraft avionics or ground vehicle suspension. 
The Pemd is a near-final system configuration and can be considered a very mature prototype 
that addresses the full spectrum of performance requirements. 
The extant literature would indicated that the most effective prototyping efforts are 
those that are launched in the context of a known and stable knowledge of the end-state 
configuration (Borowski, 2012; Drezner, 1992). From a classic design standpoint, the 
problem has been completely decomposed, technical challenges properly identified, and a 
comprehensive concept developed. Subsystem prototypes (Ps) contribute to the 
development of a technical demonstrator prototype (Pt) that focuses on a limited number of 
critical technical challenges. The technical resolutions and remaining requirements are 
incorporated into a developmental prototype (Pd). The lessons learned from Pd are reflected 
in Pemd. Table 1 summarizes this progression and integrates the design cycle of Figure 1 
with the preceding discussion. 
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 Classic Design Engineering Prototyping 
 
Table 1 outlines the situation where the end configuration, and, consequently, the 
instantiation of Pemd, is well defined. The evolution of the F-16 Falcon reflects the 
progression of Table 1. The Pemd configuration changed very little from the Pd, “Y-plane,” 
prototype and resulted in a relatively trouble-free operational introduction and 
maintainability. The maintenance to flight hour ratio for the production aircraft was very 
similar to that of Pemd (Smith et al., 1996). 
The F-16 prototyping approach serves well with a closed design process (Dc), where 
the Pemd has a well-understood configuration. Advancing prototype engineering where the 
end configuration is undefined, or open design (Do), can have any number of unintended 
consequences. The early engineering for the F-117 stealth fighter focused almost entirely on 
an aircraft plan form optimized for low radar cross-section (RCS), even though the design 
was closed in the sense that the end configuration was known to be a manned penetrator 
aircraft. Once the low RCS performance was demonstrated, these key elements of the Pt 
were transitioned directly to Pemd. Key design elements that would have been demonstrated 
in a Pd, such as logistic support and maintainability, were notably absent. As a result, the 
maintenance of the F-117 per flight hour greatly exceeded the F-16 and other contemporary 
aircraft (Smith et al., 1996). 
The designers of the first Plutonium production reactors faced a similar leap from Pt 
to Pemd, but within an open design, Do, context. The end configuration was almost completely 
undefined. The first production reactors for the Manhattan Project suffered a near-
catastrophic engineering design flaw stemming directly from the leap between Pt and Pemd. 
Enrico Fermi’s Chicago Pile-1 (CP-1) demonstrated the first sustainable nuclear reaction in 
late 1942—the primary focus of the effort; however, the CP-1 did little to inform the Pemd for 
the DuPont designers charged with building a production reactor, other than demonstrating 
a sustainable chain reaction. The first production reactor, the Hanford B-Reactor, went 
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critical only to shut down within a few hours because of Xenon poisoning, a known by-
product of nuclear fission. Fortunately, the DuPont engineers had built in extra critical 
capacity that enabled the design to successfully operate once the failure mechanism was 
understood. Simply scaling up Pt left unanswered vital technical questions critical to the 
effective operation of Pemd (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010). 
Prototypes Are Value-Added—In the Right Context 
Examining defense acquisition programs using the Ps to Pemd spectrum and the idea 
of Do and Dc reveals that virtually all programs engage in some type of prototyping. The F-35 
program is ostensibly a closed design, although its parallel design and manufacturing model 
means that production aircraft of the current tranche are Pemd for later production tranches 
as design efforts move forward. The DDG-1000 program is also a closed design in that the 
end configuration was always a surface combatant; however, it brought together a number 
of subsystem, Ps, prototypes, such as integrated electric drive, a new self-defense radar, low 
RCS and infrared characteristics, and an advanced gun system for later integration into a 
coherent whole. Programs use prototypes, but to what end? 
In defense acquisition programs, the role of the prototype is either (1) the validation 
of earlier design decisions, (2) a mechanism for addressing specific technical challenges 
that are critical to the program, (3) the verification of contract specifications, or (4) enhance 
competition and support acquisition decisions. It can be argued that programs already do a 
fair amount of prototyping under (1) and (2) with Ps and Pt efforts; however, the conventional 
way of thinking about prototyping centers around the Pd and Pemd articles that are at the 
heart of the “fly before you buy” approach. This is not a new concept, but it has recently 
been reinforced from senior DoD leadership. 
In 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD[AT&L]) mandated the use of competitive prototyping with the goal of lowering 
development costs by using competition at the pre-Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (pre-EMD) stage (Young, 2007). The missive is notable in that it explicitly 
defines the role of prototyping within the defense acquisition system. Design teams were to 
henceforth focus on producing designs for manufacture and production, and competitive 
prototyping was the means to that end. The instruction goes as far as directing that “large 
teams should be producing detailed manufacturing design—not solving myriad technical 
issues.” 
The 2007 letter assigned a definitive and explicit role for Pd and Pemd prototyping 
efforts within the defense acquisition systems. The intent was to curb the cost and schedule 
growth of programs that were spending an increasing amount of time, talent, and funding to 
mature technologies instead of producing designs for manufacture (GAO, 1999, 2009). The 
unintended consequence was to marginalize the idea of prototyping, particularly at the Ps 
level, as a way to inform design decisions. 
The 2007 mandate is effective where there are a variety of competitors with the 
ability to produce Pd and Pemd prototypes as part of a competition. Unfortunately, this has not 
been the case for some decades (Watts, 2008; Watts & Harrison, 2011). The number of 
companies capable of large systems integration into a comprehensive weapon system is 
few. Even if there were a healthy number of competitors, the cost of structuring three or 
more competitions among Pd/Pemd articles would be prohibitive (Overstreet, Bates, & 
Mallicoat, 2013). The following figure illustrates the relative costs of developing prototypes 
along the Ps through Pemd spectrum. 
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 Program Cost Versus Prototyping Phase for Defense Acquisition 
Programs 
Figure 3 indicates an order of magnitude higher cost for each phase of prototyping. 
Subsystem prototypes are roughly in the millions-of-dollars range, while more complex 
prototypes at the X- and Y-plane level are $10–$100 million-dollar efforts. A Pemd competitive 
prototype that would meet the intent of the 2007 directive would likely be a $1 billion effort. 
The estimates are low, although the exact numbers are secondary to the overall shape of 
the cost curve. 
The “fly before you buy” strategy makes sense when multiple vendors can produce 
Pemd articles at an affordable cost. For some defense industrial base sectors, this is 
impractical, as there is little competition remaining. The tactical aircraft “gene pool” is now so 
restricted that a Pemd type of competition makes little sense and would not effectively inform 
a competition (Borowski, 2012; Drezner et al., 1992; Lorell et al., 1995). 
The 2007 direction emphasizes prototyping as a path to quality manufacturing design 
and admonishes design teams to avoid “solving myriad technical issues.” This stands the 
whole nature of prototyping on its head. Design teams are most certainly in the business of 
solving the technical issues to get to the point of being able to integrate subsystems and 
assemblies into larger designs. The skills developed in prototyping at the Ps and Pt levels are 
necessary to produce prototypes at Pd and Pemd. The next section discusses how 
prototyping at the various levels can be used to preserve design skills. 
Preserving Design Skills Through Prototyping 
The DoD is embarking on a new initiative to establish a technical offset strategy that 
will maintain the U.S. technology lead in defense systems. Similar to the offset strategies of 
the 1950s and 1970s, this one is meant to identify critical technology areas where U.S. 
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dominance is strategically important. It also emphasizes prototyping to maintain the skills of 
industrial design teams (Weisberger, 2014). This paper has so far discussed how designers 
work, some proposed attributes of effective design teams, and prototyping in the context of 
defense acquisition. At what level of prototyping do design teams get the most benefit from 
the prototyping effort? 
Prototyping Benefits to Design Team Attributes 
The Ps–Pemd and Dc/Do conceptual framework makes it possible to qualitatively 
identify which design team attributes are strengthened by various types of prototyping as 
shown in Table 2. 
 Prototyping Efforts Contribution to Design Team Attributes 
 
The rows of Table 2 are the types of prototyping activities and their qualitative 
contribution to the desired attributes of a design team that produces an operationally 
realized design, that is, one that is in service and deployed. The columns are the previously 
identified design team attributes. The yellow cells indicate no strong benefit to a design team 
attribute, while the green cells represent positive contributions to those attributes. 
Not surprisingly, engaging in a Pemd effort contributes to the health of design teams, 
as it exercises or takes advantage of all attributes. It not only exercises the complete design 
cycle, but also leverages experience, firm-specific knowledge, and the design aspects of 
production, manufacturing, and logistics engineering required in a deployed system. The Pd 
level is almost as effective as Pemd; however without logistics, manufacturing, or production 
design required, the size of a Pd team may be much less than for a Pemd effort. How much 
less is a matter of debate. Drezner (1992) estimates that the minimum size of a design team 
can be as low as 75% of a full production and maintenance team, although this was 
estimated in the context of a large and competitive tactical aircraft industrial base. 
At the Pt and Ps levels, the positive effects on design teams are less because the 
scope of the effort is lower. The Pt effort is focused on specific technical challenges where 
the architecture of the end system and the efficiency of the design solutions are secondary. 
The team size of producing a Pt X-plane article is likely less than producing a Pd Y-plane. 
Experience, leveraging firm-specific knowledge, and technical currency are positively 
exercised. Developing Ps articles at the subsystem level likely does not contribute to the 
attributes of a product design team, but does contribute to the number of partial solutions 
available to a design team. 
Combining the assessments of Table 2 with the cost curve of Figure 3 confirms what 
is intuitive to most experienced acquisition practitioners—producing increasingly 
operationally representative prototypes is only achievable through increased costs. The new 
insight is that the various attributes of an effective design team are increasingly exercised at 
the higher levels of system integration complexity seen in operationally representative 
prototypes. The more complete exercise of the design cycle involves multiple types of 
design expertise, from the conceptual to the logistic and operational. 
Extrapolating the trend would indicate that Pemd prototyping is the only way to 
maintain design team viability. This may be true in narrow cases, but it ignores the 
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conceptual divide between Ps/Pt and Pd/Pemd efforts. At the lower levels of prototyping, the 
end design configuration is secondary to the specific technical challenges addressed. Final 
design architecture is not known—it is a Do environment. The design team attributes of size, 
system architecture knowledge, design team activity, and solution efficiency are less 
important than experience, firm-specific knowledge, and technology currency. At higher 
levels, in a Dc environment, the architectural knowledge of the operational configuration 
becomes a primary consideration. 
The effectiveness of Pd/Pemd prototypes is the most in the Dc environment of an 
acquisition program, an idea supported by much of the extant literature (Arena et al., 2006; 
Borowski, 2012; Coble et al., 2014; Drezner, 1992; Drezner et al., 1992; Drezner & Huang, 
2009). It is also the environment addressed by the OUSD(AT&L) 2007 directive on 
competitive prototyping (Young, 2007). The Ps/Pt efforts are most effective in Do 
environments where the novelty of solutions and focus on technical challenges are critical. 
Historically, the Do context has been the environment of the technologist and basic science 
researcher, although many programs have found it necessary to mature key technologies in 
addition to developing product architectures and designs (GAO, 2006, 2009; Studt, 2006). 
Three approaches to prototyping and its design team benefits are discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
The Design Bureau Approach 
The simplest way to maintain an existing design team is to keep it working on 
developing new, or improving old, designs. Congressional funding has often been used to 
maintain existing production lines and design teams, even when the end article is 
superfluous. The United States already realizes this situation with the M1A1 Abrams tank. 
New variants are being ordered to maintain the single production plant in Lima, Ohio, even 
though the Army has sufficient quantities to meet its needs for the foreseeable future. In 
many respects it is analogous to the old Soviet approach of ordering another tactical fighter 
or bomber from the Mikoyan or Tupelov design bureau. 
Fully exercising a design team in this way would require design scope and effort 
resulting in a Pemd prototype and its attendant costs. The positive attributes would be that the 
design team would be working on a closed design with a known architecture with perhaps 
minimal improvement. The negative aspects are almost the mirror image of the positive. 
Technical innovation is hampered as designers work with their known and familiar technical 
solutions in maintaining a closed design. Without adjudication of new requirements or 
system architecture, the end configuration is likely to be very similar to the legacy article.  
Technical Demonstrators—A Few Challenging Problems 
An alternate strategy is to move down the prototyping spectrum and focus on test 
articles that address critical technology needs. The implicit assumption is that designers 
would be working in a Do environment, where a final system configuration is left 
unaddressed. Design teams in this type of prototyping are free to utilize innovative partial 
solutions that address the main technical challenge without the need to compromise with 
production constraints. In a Do environment, where there is no dominant legacy system 
architecture, multiple design teams are free to pursue innovative and potentially disruptive 
solutions (Christensen, 1997; Clark, 1985; Henderson & Clark, 1990). The cost of 
developing a technology demonstrator prototype can be an order of magnitude less than 
that of a Pd or Pemd variant. 
Prototyping can be cheap, fast, and creative in the permissive Do environment. The 
main drawback is that the technical solutions produced may have little alignment with 
defense needs and requirements. Prototypes at the Ps level produce optimized designs for 
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the subsystem technical challenges. They represent partial solutions that are the building 
blocks for system designers, but are rarely comprehensive to the point of underpinning 
entire system architectures. Integrating up to the Pt level makes for a more comprehensive 
partial solution, but one that may still fall short of supporting a full system architecture, as 
was seen in the F-117 and Manhattan Project development efforts. 
Architectural Prototyping 
Simply maintaining design teams or developing unfocused prototypes is not the 
answer. The former puts existing architectures and thinking in stasis and expends resources 
against design teams that become increasingly irrelevant as their architectural knowledge 
becomes dated and stale. The latter is essentially the technology transition problem the DoD 
now faces with commercial technologies. They represent advanced partial solutions to 
defense design problems; however, in a Do environment there is no unifying architectural 
concept to bridge the “valley of death” between laboratory bench and acquisition program 
(Beard et al., 2009). 
The presence or absence of system architecture determines whether the prototyping 
activity is in the science/technology domain (a Do environment) or the acquisition domain (a 
Dc environment). The presence of an architectural framework facilitates the development of 
Pd and Pemd prototypes as it guides a design team’s approach to problem decomposition, 
depth of analysis, and choice of partial solutions used to arrive at a complete design. The 
system architecture, like the architecture of a building, possesses design elements and 
motifs that can be judiciously extended and modified to extend the utility of the architecture. 
With dated architectures there is little flexibility to pace the threat and operational 
environment; the design team is challenged to improve the design without breaking the 
system architecture. 
Design teams can remain technically current and active by considering the design 
and prototyping of the architectures themselves. Developing and prototyping system 
architecture, rather than a specific design, offers the design team the opportunity to 
integrate state-of-the-practice technology in new ways that meets overall capability 
requirements. The quality metric of a prototype architecture would be its ability to deliver 
capability as its base technologies change over time. A suitably flexible architecture would 
yield a number of specific designs depending on the design team selection of specific Ps 
partial solutions chosen by the design team. 
This architectural prototyping is similar to Pt prototyping; however, it works on a 
higher level than that of a product design. For example, the F-117 prototype integrated 
existing technology in support of a low-observable design. An architectural prototype would 
develop a low-observable architecture broader than the design of a manned tactical fighter. 
Designers would consider component technologies and their associated technology 
trajectories to avoid point solutions with limited futures. Different plan forms and 
technologies would be compared as part of a low-observable architecture that offered 
varying levels of stealth capability. 
Harmonizing Prototyping Approaches 
The prototyping approaches discussed exercise design skills but at different levels. 
Ps and Pt efforts operate at the low to middle region of the design scale, while Pd and Pemd 
efforts work most effectively at the more comprehensive end. Prototyping at the subsystem 
and tech demo level are the basic elements of more complex systems, relatively cheap to 
achieve, but unfocused without an overarching architecture. The more complex prototypes 
are orders of magnitude more expensive. 
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The most ephemeral skill maintained by higher order prototypes is the integrative 
facilities of the design team and its ability put together complex systems into a unified whole. 
Prototyping architectures, rather than an individual design, can provide the design team with 
developing a capability architecture that can accommodate a number of specific designs 
that meet the same capability requirement. 
Prototyping architectures place more emphasis on general- and system-specific, 
rather than firm-specific, knowledge. This would seem to put industrial design teams at a 
disadvantage, but there is no reason to believe industry, with the proper incentive, could not 
engage in more abstract design activities. Designing at the architecture level removes some 
of the intellectual property issues that have become increasingly common with government 
and industry cooperation. Expanding the number of potential architectures multiplies the 
number of potential designs and design solutions, exercises many of the design skills noted 
in this paper, and makes for a richer design environment at the beginning of acquisition 
programs. 
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